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Abstract
Architectures relying on continuous authentication
require a secure way to challenge the user’s identity without
trusting that the Continuous Authentication Subsystem
(CAS) has not been compromised, i.e., that the response
to the layer which manages service/application access
is not fake. In this paper, we introduce the CALIPER
protocol, in which a separate Continuous Access Verifi-
cation Entity (CAVE) directly challenges the user’s iden-
tity in a continuous authentication regime. Instead of
simply returning authentication probabilities or confidence
scores, CALIPER’s CAS uses live hard and soft biometric
samples from the user to extract a cryptographic private
key embedded in a challenge posed by the CAVE. The
CAS then uses this key to sign a response to the CAVE.
CALIPER supports multiple modalities, key lengths, and
security levels and can be applied in two scenarios: One
where the CAS must authenticate its user to a CAVE running
on a remote server (device-server) for access to remote
application data, and another where the CAS must authenti-
cate its user to a locally running trusted computing module
(TCM) for access to local application data (device-TCM).
We further demonstrate that CALIPER can leverage device
hardware resources to enable privacy and security even
when the device’s kernel is compromised, and we show how
this authentication protocol can even be expanded to obfus-
cate direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM) malwares.
1. Introduction
Two fundamental problems exist with conventional pass-
word, token, and biometric authentication schemes. The
first problem is one of infrequent authentication. Assuming
that a legitimate user performed the initial authentication,
there is no validation mechanism to ensure that the same
user that logged in is the same user using the device minutes
or hours later. Such authentication schemes guarantee only
that the current user of the device possessed a password,
biometric, or security token at the time of login. This guar-
antee does nothing to address post-login risk: If Bob steals
Alice’s phone while Alice is still logged on to her bank
account, Bob can do catastrophic harm to Alice, regardless
of how many questions the bank asked or the number of
factors of authentication used during the initial login.
The second problem is one of remote trust. Remote
services must trust the authentication subsystem: They have
no independent way to challenge a user’s identity. If Bob
steals Alice’s authentication credentials, Bob will still be
authenticated by Alice’s bank, since the bank can only
establish the veracity or lack thereof of the login credentials.
Bob can continue to login until Alice or the bank notice
and/or change Alice’s password. Note that device authenti-
cation methods by themselves, in which the user authenti-
cates to the device and the device authenticates to a remote
entity still do not solve the remote trust problem. Even
under the idealized fictional assumption of perfect device
authentication, i.e., the remote entity only knows that the
actual device’s user authentication module “said” that the
user was valid. It has no independent way to challenge the
user. If Bob has stolen Alice’s device and password, he
poses a security risk, even under this naive fictional assump-
tion of perfect device authentication.
These two shortcomings in conventional authentication
schemes can allow an adversary to gain access to the device
post-login, which at the very least compromises the session.
Further, they may allow an adversary to steal or spoof login
credentials for later use at the adversary’s discretion, poten-
tially compromising confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability of all data to which the legitimate user of the device
has access.
Recent advances in continuous authentication offer
promising solutions to the infrequent authentication
problem. In continuous authentication, a device continu-
ously obtains hard and soft biometrics in a manner trans-
parent to the user so that local or remote services may
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continuously determine whether to maintain the user’s
authentication credentials as legitimate or to de-authenticate
the user. Moreover, continuous authentication offers the
appeal of enhancing user experience by reducing explicit
password prompts. To our knowledge, however, continuous
authentication architectures to date focus solely on authen-
tication confidence. This does not address the remote trust
problem: Even if authentication subsystems use biometrics
that provide strong authentication confidence, it is insuffi-
cient for the continuous authentication layers to return the
probabilities of valid users, because other local layers or
remote services then have to trust that the response was not
fake. Whether the client device is physically compromised
via theft or remotely compromised via malware, an adver-
sary need only change one bit to defeat such weak security.
To overcome the limitations of conventional authenti-
cation systems, we present a protocol to harden contin-
uous authentication implementations against scenarios in
which the local or remote Continuous Access Verification
Entity (CAVE) cannot trust that the Continuous Authen-
tication Subsystem (CAS) client has not been compro-
mised by theft or malware on the device. Henceforth, we
refer to this authentication protocol CALIPER – Contin-
uous Authentication Layered with Integrated PKI Encoding
Recognition. CALIPER is a continuous authentication
protocol, where continuous hard (e.g., face, speech) and
soft (e.g., keystroke data, application data, resource usage
data) biometric data are collected using existing device I/O
API infrastructure and are then transformed into an inter-
mediate classifier / feature space representation for use as
basic blocks in a biocryptographic ensemble. Unlike tradi-
tional biometric verification schemes or other continuous
authentication approaches, the result is a system that lever-
ages a PKI encoding to support challenge-response key
exchange so that other local or remote services do not
have to trust only the output of the continuous authenti-
cation subsystem (CAS); Instead they can challenge the
CAS directly about a given user and even use biocryotpo-
graphics [21] to exchange/manage public keys. The contri-
butions of this paper are as follows:
1. We introduce CALIPER, the first authentication
protocol that addresses both infrequent authenti-
cation and remote trust problems with conven-
tional authentication schemes. CALIPER general-
izes password-combined, one-time, single-modality
remote vaulted verification (VV) protocols to a
continuous, multiple-modality, biocryptographic key
exchange/renewal protocol. CALIPER’s basic blocks
are not dependent on any one classifier type or even
a machine learning classifier in the traditional sense,
which allows CALIPER to form challenges based on
CAS device specifications too, becoming a unified 3-
factor authentication protocol.
2. We present different scenarios for applying CALIPER
as an access control protocol: a device-server scenario,
where a CAS residing on a client device must authenti-
cate its user to a CAVE running on a remote server, and
a device-TCM scenario, where a CAS must authenti-
cate a user to a CAVE resident on a trusted computing
module (TCM), e.g., a TPM, SIM card, or GPU
running on the same local device, in order to run an
application.
3. Although CALIPER is an authentication protocol,
its flexibility allows us to apply it to other prob-
lems in computer security. We demonstrate how the
protocol can be used to maintain security even in
the event of OS kernel compromise, and even obfus-
cate attacks through Address Space Layout Person-
alization (ASLP), a novel approach to address space
layout randomization (ASLR), whose security does
not depend on an intact kernel.
2. Background
The CALIPER protocol combines the concepts of
continuous authentication and biocryptographic challenge-
response. The earliest work on continuous authentication
systems dates back to the early 1990’s, in which Leggett et
al. proposed using keystroke characteristics as a “dynamic
identity verifier” to overcome the static nature of session
passwords: “Normally, the user is asked for the password
at log-in time and the system assumes that the user is the
same person until log-off time” [17]. The term contin-
uous authentication in the biometric sense dates back to
1995, again applied to keyboard dynamics [23]. Since then,
various research has been published on applying continuous
authentication across many modalities, e.g., [4, 7, 8, 9, 16,
18, 14].
Recently, continuous authentication has gained
increased interest in the mobile domain, largely due
to the explosion of the mobile device market, the increasing
number of sensors available on mobile devices, the
increasing need for mobile security, and the increased accu-
racy and decreased processing costs of applying machine
learning algorithms. Large companies are now actively
pursuing continuous authentication frameworks for mobile
devices, for example, Google Inc. recently announced
Project Abacus [1], a fused multi-modal continuous
authentication framework for Android devices. However,
no continuous authentication framework to date to our
knowledge addresses the problem of CAS compromise on
the local device, but instead, these frameworks implicitly
trust that the CAS has not been compromised and that there
is not, e.g., a rootkit hooking CAS binaries. We contend
that this implicit trust is the weak link in the security
of most proposed, prototyped, and fielded continuous
authentication systems.
CALIPER guarantees security and privacy via an exten-
sion of the Vaulted Verification protocol proposed by Wilber
et al. in [25]. VV was originally proposed as an exten-
sion of fuzzy vaults [15] to address the numerous secu-
rity problems with fuzzy vaults and fuzzy extractors [6]
that were reported by Scheirer et al. in [22]. These
problems include template privacy/security vulnerabilities
in the event of server compromise, man-in-the-middle
attacks, replay attacks, blended substitution attacks, and
non-revocability of biometric models/tokens [22]. Johnson
presents over 60 pages of analysis on the security of the VV
protocol in [13]. This analysis indicates that the protocol,
under proper implementation, is secure against such attacks.
The VV protocol is a client-server protocol that can be
summarized as follows: During enrollment, the client takes
real biometric samples and generates chaff samples. Models
for both real and chaff are created and (real, chaff) model
pairs, each pair encrypted with the client key, all pairs
encrypted with the server key, along with corresponding
ground truth, are sent to the server. The client then securely
wipes all data from memory. During authentication, the
server generates a random key with which it changes the
order of each (real, chaff) pair depending on whether the
corresponding key element is 1 or 0 respectively. The server
then sends a challenge to the client, consisting of pairs
swapped according to the key. Upon receiving the pairs, the
client, using live biometric samples in conjunction with the
challenge models, responds with a guess of the key. Upon
receiving the client’s guess, the server checks against the
actual key. If enough bits are correct for the security policy
in question, the server authenticates the client. VV also uses
nonces to protect against replay attacks.
There have been several variations of the VV protocol
over the years, including extensions to iris [26], finger-
print [2], and voice [12, 11, 10] biometrics. The latter exten-
sions incorporated public key cryptography, and reduced
communication overhead by using index tables. All of these
protocols, however, use VV strictly as a one-time, single
modality remote authentication mechanism to be combined
with password authentication. Therefore, none of them can
be incorporated into continuous authentication solutions,
which necessarily must support multiple modalities [24],
for sufficient authentication capability and a usable experi-
ence in the event of failover of one or more modality types.
This claim is not merely theoretical: commercial develop-
ment efforts [1] have leveraged several modalities in their
continuous authentication algorithms. CALIPER extends
previous VV efforts to a continuous, multiple-modality,
biocryptographic key exchange/renewal protocol.
Related to but not to be confused with the remote trust
authentication problem discussed in Sec. 1 is the problem
of remote entrusting [20, 3, 5], a more general computer
security problem in which an application running on an
untrusted device requests resources from a remote entity.
Solving the remote trust authentication problem does not
solve the remote entrusting problem, because establishing
that a user is authentic does not ensure that the device has
not been compromised by malware. If a rootkit has hooked
the device while a legitimately authenticated user is viewing
sensitive data, that sensitive data can still be compromised
at no fault of the user authentication subsystem. Remote
entrusting is an extremely difficult problem to solve because
of the problems presented by modern malwares, especially
those which hijack control flow of either legitimate applica-
tions or the kernel itself [19]. Solving the remote entrusting
problem is well beyond the scope of this paper, if it is
even possible to begin with. We can, however, mitigate the
problem by extending CALIPER beyond an access control
protocol. We present this extension in Sec. 4.2.
3. Protocol
In this section we discuss the mechanics of the
CALIPER protocol. The notation used in this protocol is
summarized in Table 1. The protocol has two stages: enroll-
ment and verification. We present the enrollment stage in
Sec. 3.1 and the verification stage in Sec.3.2.
Symbol Definition
(Kpu,Kpr) Public and private key pair generated by the
CAS.
C(Kpr) Kpr under an ECC encoding.
Kˆ C(Kpr)⊕R
Kperm Permutation key used by the server to generate
challenges.
TM Model table resident on CAS.
TC Client table residing on the CAS.
TS Server table residing on the CAVE.
h1 Hash index into TM .
h2 Hash index into TC .
h3 Hash of retrieved Kpr , shift amounts, and n2
sent as a response to the CAVE.
n1 Nonce 1.
n2 Nonce 2.
R A random pad.
UID User identifier.
MID Modality identifier.
H hash(TS ,Kpu,UID).
N Number of choices per row (≥ 2) in TS .
M Number of rows in TS . Same as the number of
challenges available at a particular time.
i Column index in TS ; i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
C Challenge.
RE Response.
Table 1: Notation used in the CALIPER protocol.
Continuous Authentication   
Verification Entity
Continuous Authentication Subsystem
Figure 1: Communication and processing tasks on the CAS and the CAVE in rough time sequence order during enrollment. The presence
of multiple numbers indicates that multiple tasks occur at approximately the same time. Dashed arrows indicate communication between
the CAS and the CAVE. White space designates times when a device is idle. Note that communication between CAS and CAVE is protected
by an encrypted channel.
3.1. Enrollment
The enrollment portion of the CALIPER protocol is
depicted in communication and processing steps in Fig. 1.
Enrollment proceeds as follows: The CAS continuously
polls different sensors and OS resources for data from a
subset of modalities, extracting feature vectors and gener-
ating an ensemble of classifiers for both real and chaff
samples. The classifier ensemble is then stored in a model
table (TM ), in which each element is a classifier, keyed on
its own hash. The CAS then generates a (public, private)
key pair (Kpr,Kpu), followed by an ECC representation
C(Kpr). A random pad, R, of the same length as C(Kpr),
is then generated and a masked key, Kˆ = C(Kpr) ⊕ R,
is created. Kˆ is then partitioned into chunks and a client
table (TC) is created. Each entry in TC consists of a hash
index (h1) into TM , which is a direct hash of each classi-
fier; an index i, which assumes values between 1 and N ,
the number of possible answers allowed to the CAS at veri-
fication time for this key fragment; Kˆi , which corresponds
to the key if i corresponds to the actual answer (real sample)
and a random number otherwise (chaff sample); and finally
the modality identifier (MID).
Each row of TC is keyed on h2, a hash of its contents.
An M -row server table (TS) is then created, with each
row containing an entry for a real classifier of a different
modality and N − 1 chaff entries, where N is the number
of choices per row, greater than or equal to 2. Each entry in
TS contains h2, the hash index into TC , the column index,
i, and the associated segment of the random pad, Ri, used
to retrieve the key if the column indexes a real model and
another random number otherwise. Note that TS may have
variable-length columns, but for simplicity of discussion we
treat them as fixed-length. After TC and TS are generated,
Kˆi,C(Kpr), and Kpr are wiped from the client’s memory.
The CAS then encrypts TS , along with the public key
that was generated by the CAS, the UID, and n1 with
the CAVE’s public key and sends them to the CAVE. The
CAS deletes its copy of TS . The CAVE then decrypts the
incoming message, extracts TS , concatenates TS with n1,
encrypts the pair with its public key, hashes this encrypted
pair, stores the hash, sends the result back to the CAS along
with n1 over an encrypted channel, and securely wipes its
own copy of the server table from memory. The CAS then
verifies n1 to ensure that the encrypted TS corresponds to
the same communication session and stores the encrypted
TS . This concludes enrollment.
3.2. Verification
The verification portion of the CALIPER protocol is
depicted in communication and processing steps in Fig. 2.
When the CAS first requests access from the CAVE or
when the continuous authentication protocol requires a new
session key, the CAS sends the CAVE a request for access,
which includes the encrypted copy of the server table.
The CAVE hashes this message and compares the gener-
ated hash against its previously stored hash to ensure that
the contents of the server table have not changed. The
CAVE then decrypts the message using its private key,
and constructs a challenge for the CAS by first selecting
a random subset of rows from the server table, then creating
a vector of random integers the length of this permuted
subset of rows. Each element of this vector assumes a value
between 0 and N − 1, where N is the length of the corre-
sponding row in the server table. The subset and permu-
tation of rows are then circularly shifted by their corre-
Client Table
ℎ2 ℎ1 𝑖  𝐾1 𝑀𝐼𝐷
ℎ1 model
Model Table
Application ID User ID Device ID
Resource Identifier
Continuous Authentication Subsystem Continuous Access Verification Entity
Server Table
Resource Identifier
HASH ( Application ID, User ID, Device ID)
Challenge # Choice 1 ⋯ Choice N
1 ℎ211 1 𝑅11 ⋯ N 𝑅1𝑁
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
M ℎ2𝑀1 1 𝑅𝑀1 ⋯ ℎ2𝑀𝑁 N 𝑅𝑀𝑁
Figure 2: The layout of index-table resources in CAS and CAVE memory. Related elements across tables are connected with solid lines.
For ease of visualization, we show a rectangular server table with M challenges with N choices per challenge. In the server table, indices
are made explicit on h2, i (the choice), and R. We show only one entry of the client table, omitting indices on h1 and h2. We index Kˆ
by i = 1 to denote the explicit correspondence with RM1 in the server table. The layout depicted in this diagram is before the challenges
in the server table have been circularly shifted; otherwise the correspondences would likely be broken. Note also that the correspondences
across tables are only hashes/indices. The CAVE sees no biometric/behavioral data; not even the type of modality. The CAS stores only
model files with no associated ground truth. Also, the CAVE’s session resource need not store user information, device information, or
even names of applications. Thus, CALIPER not only provides strong security but also significantly enhances privacy.
sponding random element, and, with the exception of the
original index, sent to the CAS. A challenge nonce n2 is
included in this message to protect against replay attacks.
When the CAS receives the challenge, it begins
constructing the response, element by element, by first
indexing into TC and retrieving appropriate values by which
to index into TM . The CAS then indexes into TM to retrieve
the corresponding challenge classifiers. By submitting live
biometric/behavioral samples to each of the retrieved classi-
fiers, the CAS can determine which models were generated
using real data. This also allows the CAS to guess the shifts
that were applied by the CAVE. The CAS can then retrieve
fragments of the encoded key by XORing the encoded key
fragments from TC with the associated random pad from
the challenge, i.e., C(Kpr)i = Kˆi ⊕Ri. Provided that the
CAS successfully retrieves enough codeword fragments, it
can run error correction on C(Kpr) to recover Kpr. It
can then piece together the permutation key Kperm that
was used by the server, and sign a response via the hash
h3 = hash(Kpr,Kperm, n2). When the CAVE decrypts
the message and successfully verifies the hash it authen-
ticates the CAS device’s user. The CAS client can also
include a message with a vector of its original guesses on
the permutations. Depending on the number of guesses that
the client got correct, the challenge unit can adjust the time
intervals / key lengths required between subsequent authen-
tications.
3.3. Implementation Considerations
Several of the security enhancements that CALIPER
provides over IVV are non-trivial to quantify: First, the
extension to multiple modalities makes spoofing CALIPER
more difficult than spoofing a single-modality IVV scheme.
Depending on the implementation, it might be desirable for
the CAVE to be able to alternate the ratios/types of modal-
ities used, which requires placing the MID in the server
table. A second way CALIPER enhances security over
conventional IVV is that it generalizes the IVV basic block
to any classifier type, thus allowing more bits of security
to be generated faster than under a single modality regime.
Previous single modality VV schemes treat the basic block
as an entity consisting of one homogeneous model type.
CALIPER’s basic blocks can consist of any type of
model on which training/classification can be performed
in a reasonable amount of time. For the face modality,
for example, basic blocks might consist of support vector
machines, while for the voice modality, basic blocks might
consist of Gaussian mixture models. Interestingly, a
basic block need not even correspond to a model in the
conventional machine learning sense; in some cases simple
comparisons of values may suffice. Let us say that we
wanted another way to verify the device itself beyond
conventional device authentication protocols. By using
hashes of disk blocks as basic blocks in the model tables,
along with the logical block addresses (LBAs) associated
with the hashes, classification reduces to indexing disk
blocks, hashing them, and performing equality checks to
determine which hashes correspond to the actual storage
layout of the device. Leveraging multiple modalities and
supplementing with simple comparison-style blocks allows
CALIPER to have more bits of security on-demand than
single modality schemes, and provides an third factor
of authentication (something the user has) over the IVV
protocol. Of course, some balance of modalities is neces-
Continuous Authentication   
Verification Entity
Continuous Authentication Subsystem
Figure 3: Communication and processing tasks on the CAS and the CAVE in rough time sequence order during verification. Dashed
arrows indicate communication between the CAS and the CAVE. Times during which a device is idle are indicated by white space. Note
that communication between CAS and CAVE is protected by an encrypted channel.
sary to provide secure authentication.
We would also like to point out that, in implementa-
tion, the security of the protocol assumes that a separate
(Kpu,Kpr) pair is used at each verification step. Otherwise
malware on the device could simply snoop Kpr, thus obvi-
ating challenge-response.
4. Applications
CALIPER offers a secure continuous authentication
model which can be mixed across many devices of hetero-
geneous architectures. Several such scenarios are discussed
in Sec. 4.1. The protocol can also be extended as a software
security feature to mitigate the spread of malware even if it
has compromised a device’s kernel. An antimalware appli-
cation is proposed in Sec. 4.2.
4.1. Cross-Device Authentication
Since the CAVE possesses no information about the
underlying biometrics or CAS implementation, it does not
require specialized biometric sensors/behavioral modules.
CAVE implementations may therefore exist on a wide array
of different device types. Moreover, adding new modalities,
e.g., integrating support for wearable technology sensors,
does not require any change to the protocol or the CAVE
architecture; only CAS client changes are required. Conse-
quently, there is no fixed requirement on the types of CAS
device hardware that may be supported, although main-
taining minimal subsets of modalities might be desirable
from a security perspective.
The literature on previous variations of Vaulted Veri-
fication summarized in Sec. 2 constrained discussions of
authentication to a context where the transfer of sensitive
information occurs between a client device and a server.
Especially for mobile devices, this type of a device-server
model provides minimal security guarantees because it does
not protect data cached on the device itself. Mobile email
clients, for example, only authenticate with a server in order
to download new emails. Once the emails have been down-
loaded, no security layer between the device and the server
can protect the contents of these emails – encrypting cached
data and using the server as a trusted central authentica-
tion authority is not feasible from a usability perspective
due to the loss of access when offline. Thus, in addi-
tion to device-server verification, a solution in which the
user authenticates to the device itself is needed. However,
if the device has been compromised by spoofing, phys-
ical theft and subsequent rooting, or by malware, then any
continuous authentication layer sharing the same memory
space runs the risk of compromise. Instead, a device-TCM
scheme is needed, in which the CAS and the CAVE run
in two disjoint address spaces – the CAS runs in the stan-
dard device address space and the CAVE runs in the address
space of a trusted computing module (TCM), which by
design is very difficult to compromise.
One way to accomplish address space separation is to
move the CAVE into the OS kernel itself. Although this
increases the cost of the attack, this does not remove the
vulnerability to malwares which compromise the kernel,
e.g., DKOM rootkits [19]. A better approach is to use a
physically different memory space as the TCM than that of
the CPU, with a much different processing architecture, so
that the CAVE resides on its own separate hardware. For
workstations and laptops, such a memory separation could
be accomplished by moving the CAVE onto a Trusted Plat-
form Module (TPM). For smart phones, subscriber iden-
B. DEVICE-TCM SCENARIO
A. DEVICE-SERVER SCENARIO
CAS
CAVE
CAS CAVE
Figure 4: Examples of and device-server and device-TCM
instances of the CALIPER protocol. Solid green lines indicate
CAS devices, while solid red lines indicate CAVE devices. Dashed
green and red lines indicate CAS- and CAVE-specific hardware
within a device. In the device-server scenario, the CAS layer,
running on a mobile phone in this example, authenticates the user
to a remote banking server’s CAVE in order to process a trans-
action. The CAVE runs on a remote server and challenges the
CAS residing on the user’s phone about the user’s identity. In the
device-TCM scenario, both the CAS and the CAVE run on the
phone. The CAS runs on the same CPU as the banking applica-
tion, and authenticates the user to the CAVE, which runs on a SIM
card. In this scenario, the SIM card manages access to local appli-
cation data by the CPU.
tity modules (SIM cards) could be used instead. Both
TPMs and SIM cards are equipped with cryptographic
modules and support permutation, indexing, and compar-
ison operations necessary to perform CAVE functionalities.
Graphical Processing Units (GPUs) also have their own
memory spaces as well as programming models which are
sufficiently general to support CAVE functionality, while
lacking sufficient generalization to easily support most
malwares.
Schematics of device-server and device-TCM variations
of CALIPER are shown in Fig. 4 in the context of a
mobile online banking application. Note that device-TCM
and device-server applications should not be thought of as
disjoint contexts since they often occur simultaneously. For
example, the banking application running on a smart phone
in Fig. 4 might leverage a CAVE running on a SIM card
to verify the user, while making network connections to a
bank which uses its server resident CAVE to verify the user
against the same CAS.
4.2. Remote Entrusting
In Sec. 4.1, we discussed how CALIPER addresses
local and remote authentication problems. However,
CALIPER can also be applied to address more general
remote entrusting issues. In this section, we present a novel
application in which CALIPER can be applied to provide
enhanced protection against malware.
One method most modern operating systems use to attain
robustness to attacks is to randomize the address space
layout at load time. This technique is commonly referred
to as address space layout randomization or ASLR. The
objective of ASLR is to make attacks more difficult by
removing the attacker’s ability to know the memory address
space layout apriori: It is difficult to write code to hijack
control flow if the address of the hook point is unknown,
especially in a large 64-bit address space. Unfortunately,
the utility of ASLR assumes a trusted device kernel. If the
device’s kernel is compromised, then ASLR can be disabled
or modified to yield a deterministic address space layout,
e.g., by hooking the random number generator.
To this end, we introduce address space layout personal-
ization (ASLP), a concept which is in some ways similar to
ASLR, but is far less vulnerable to kernel compromise. In
ASLP, compilation and linking of executables is done on the
vendor’s server on which the CAVE resides. Randomization
of code segments is keyed by the CAVE’s challenge. When
the CAS client attempts to load the application, the only
way to correctly address segments is to answer the CAVE’s
challenges via live biometric/usage samples and recover the
key. This significantly raises the bar for the attacker, since
segment ordering is now user-specific and generic malware
cannot hook the application by simply disabling ASLR. If
the randomization of ASLP is disabled, then the applica-
tion will simply fail to load. Of course, there is a chance
that a rootkit can glean information about the load order by
snooping on the address space at load time, but the address
space layout for one or more particular instances is not
particularly useful for a malicious code author: each user
of each application has his/her own unique address space
layout. Also, in the event of a security breach, the server
can re-deploy code to the client, this time randomized with a
different CALIPER key. The knowledge of a given address
space layout is only applicable to a single CALIPER key for
a single user.
5. Discussion
While it might seem grandiose to claim that the
CALIPER protocol can operate using the constrained
computational resources of a SIM card as a CAVE, it is
important to realize that most of CALIPER’s processing and
storage is performed on the CAS, which we assume has at
least the computational and storage capacities of modern
smartphones. The CAVE must support primitive arithmetic
and cryptographic operations as most modern SIM cards
do. It must also be able to store the server table. The
exact server table size is implementation dependent, but for
a feasibility assessment, let us assume that we have a 128
KB SIM card for our CAVE. Let us further assume that we
are using SHA-256 digests (32 bytes each) as our hashes,
that each row in our server table has four choices, only one
of which is correct, and that Kpr and Kpu are 2048 bit RSA
keys. Then C(Kpr), and henceR take 2048 bits if we move
the error correcting symbols to the CAS for compactness,
which can easily be done without compromising security.
Finally, let us assume that the server table has 4 choices per
row in each of 128 rows per key. The server then requires
256 bytes for Kpu, 32 bytes for the UIDhash, and 140 bytes
(4 × 2 for R, 4 × 1 for i, and 4 × 32 for h2) for each row
in the server table. Under the 128 KB SIM card assump-
tion, the CAVE has enough storage capacity for the CAS to
reconstruct seven 2048 bit public keys.
Continuous authentication is in its early stages, so we
acknowledge that this feasibility analysis, although it might
seem reasonable at face value, may or may not be appro-
priate, depending on the application in question. According
to the security analysis in [13] our example is secure in
comparison to conventional password authentication stan-
dards (in terms of bits of security) for a single modality.
Research suggests that multiple modalities serve to enhance
security [24], although how well they do so is still an
open research question. As continuous authentication tech-
nologies, e.g., [1], are fielded, it will be interesting to
see what constitutes a good balance of modalities. Some
modalities have been documented to yield higher authen-
tication accuracies than others, but the amount of inde-
pendent information that each modality adds, conditioned
on the presence of others for particular authentication plat-
forms has yet to be researched, as does the impact of missed
detections and missing modalities on the tradeoff between
authentication performance and usability. The biometrics
and behavioral data used in the CALIPER protocol need
not be entirely available on-demand, although the extent
of temporal evidence accumulation that can practically be
accommodated depends on the tradeoff between security
and usability. If the CAS consistently makes substantial
errors in its guesses, then ramping up security by reducing
the lengths of time windows for sensor data acquisition, and
perhaps even requiring active authentication – i.e., explicit
prompts for user input – may be a reasonable security
failover. We leave these topics for future research.
While CALIPER adds a significant improvement to the
security of all proposed and fielded continuous authen-
tication technologies that we are aware of, it does
not eliminate all security vulnerabilities. As with any
biometric/biocryptographic protocol, the security of the
protocol is compromised if the biometrics are compro-
mised at the time of enrollment. If the device is root-
compromised after enrollment, it is still extremely diffi-
cult for an attacker to access local or remote data while
the device is not in use. When the device is used while
in a root-compromised state, however, no biometric-based
system can protect users in the long run without a re-keyed
protocol because an attacker can eventually gather the data
to construct a complete biometric profile of the user. While
this is not required to recover Kpr alone, the vulnera-
bility ofKpr is partially ameliorated by challenge-response:
For multiple attempts, the key alone is insufficient and the
CAVE would still be able to reject the attacker. Another
option would be to move generation and retrieval of Kpr
to the CAVE. This protects Kpr from immediate compro-
mise and potential key-inversion attacks by malware on the
CAS, but eventually, after multiple legitimate authentica-
tions on behalf of the user, a malware could intercept raw
sensor data to develop a more complete biometric profile
and thus answer the challenges. Thus, as a measure of intru-
sion detection, it is critical that a CAVE occasionally send a
challenge that is expected to fail and check that no valid key
is returned before the attacker has a chance to compromise
the biometric/behavioral data. A compromised kernel is
generally non-trivial for any authentication system. This is
one of the reasons why we extended the CALIPER protocol
as a remote entrusting mechanism to help protect the CAS’s
kernel (cf. Sec. 4.2).
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